Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management

Build me a supplier register in Tracecat. Create a table of every vendor with the data they touch, the access they have into our environment, and a criticality score. Seed it from the vendor list in Vanta, cross-reference Okta to see which vendors actually have SSO apps and active integrations, and flag vendors that appear in Okta but not in the register. Post new and changed entries to the vendor risk Slack channel each month. First help me understand how this maps to GV.SC-04 and what good criticality criteria look like: data sensitivity, system access, and mission impact. Ask me what criticality tiers we want and what data classification levels we use. Talk me through scoring vendors with fixed rules versus letting an agent propose scores for me to confirm.

Build me a supplier risk monitoring automation in Tracecat. Watch Feedly for breach reports, ransomware claims, and serious vulnerabilities tied to vendors in our supplier register. When a story matches a critical supplier, open a Tracecat case with the article, the supplier's criticality tier, and what they have access to, then alert the vendor risk Slack channel. Matches on lower-tier vendors go into a weekly digest instead. First help me understand how this maps to GV.SC-07 and why monitoring a supplier's risk profile matters as much as the point-in-time assessment. Ask me which vendors count as critical and how to handle name collisions in news matching. Talk me through the threshold between opening a case immediately and saving it for the digest.

Build me a vendor due diligence automation in Tracecat. When procurement opens a new vendor request in Jira, create a case and have an agent do the first pass: pull company background from Sixtyfour, check Feedly for past breaches, collect the vendor's trust center documents and subprocessor list, and draft a risk assessment against our security requirements. Route the draft to the security reviewer with an approve or investigate decision, and write the outcome back to the Jira ticket. First help me understand how this maps to GV.SC-06 and how due diligence depth should scale with the vendor's risk and criticality. Ask me what our minimum security requirements are and who signs off on each tier. Talk me through which checks the agent can complete alone and where the human review gate belongs.

Build me a supplier offboarding automation in Tracecat. When a vendor is marked terminated in the supplier register, open an offboarding case with tasks: disable their SSO app and service accounts in Okta, remove their guest accounts in Entra ID, drop their outside collaborators from GitHub, and confirm return or destruction of our data. Have the workflow verify each revocation actually happened, re-check after 30 days for anything recreated, and attach the evidence to the case. First help me understand how this maps to GV.SC-10 and why supplier access tends to outlive supplier contracts. Ask me where vendor terminations get recorded today and which systems grant third parties access. Talk me through which revocations can run automatically and which need an approval gate.

Build me a supplier incident coordination setup in Tracecat. Keep a table of critical suppliers with their security contacts, reporting deadlines, and agreed communication protocols. When an incident case is tagged with a vendor, pull that supplier's protocol into the case, draft the notification email in Gmail for my approval, and track every exchange as case comments. After closure, have an agent draft the joint lessons-learned document in Notion. First help me understand how this maps to GV.SC-08 and what suppliers genuinely need from us during a shared incident. Ask me which suppliers have contractual notification deadlines and how fast they expect to hear from us. Talk me through whether any notification should ever send without human approval.

Build me a software supply chain check in Tracecat. When a pull request in GitHub adds or upgrades a dependency, look it up in Snyk for known vulnerabilities and malicious package flags, and verify it comes from the expected registry and publisher rather than a lookalike. Comment the findings on the pull request, open a Linear issue when something fails the provenance check, and post a weekly summary of new dependencies and their sources to the security Slack channel. First help me understand how this maps to GV.SC-09 and why provenance records for acquired components matter beyond vulnerability counts. Ask me which repositories to cover first and which package registries we trust. Talk me through blocking the pull request automatically versus commenting and letting the reviewer decide.